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ABSTRACT: 
 
Fund disclosure is an important communication tool between trustees and fund members for 
product comparison and credibility verification. We examine what drives Australian not-for-
profit superannuation funds to disclose their fund product information to the market. Our 
research derives a model that shows how the proprietary costs of disclosure and fund 
governance drive the disclosure of information about trustee, investment agents, fees, and 
overall practices. The research findings indicate that disclosure costs have a significant 
negative influence on voluntary disclosure, while board size has a weak positive relation with 
disclosure. Board independence is an unreliable and insignificant explanatory variable for 
voluntary disclosure. We discuss how the multi-layer agency relationship and institutional 
factors in the superannuation funds industry influence the power of these factors and their 
effects on voluntary disclosure. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The superannuation industry is a significant segment of the Australian economy, 
occupying a vital role in its pension system and financial markets. While ensuring the long-
term sustainability of Australia’s retirement schemes, superannuation funds also represent 
powerful institutional investors who are able to make decisions that can have major impacts 
on Australia’s economic development. On 1 July 2005, the Australian Government enacted 
new laws allowing employees to choose which fund will manage their contribution. As with 
any investment assessment, the decision to choose a superannuation fund relies on market 
data and the information disclosed by funds. The Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (ASIC) and the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) provide 
guidelines on the way superannuation funds disclose governance and product information via 
their product disclosure statements, financial statements and other promotional materials. The 
Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Regulations (SIS Act) 1994 and the Corporations Act 
2001 requires superannuation funds to lodge regular financial disclosure, but the current 
disclosure by funds is inconsistent. There is currently a lack of “systematic transparency” in 
the superannuation funds industry; specifically, there is a lack of standardised methodology 
for the calculation and disclosure format of investment options, risk, return and costs of funds 
to provide quality information for any expert analysis (Cooper, 2010). Through our data 
collection, we found that although funds are required to disclose their costs, there is no 
information being reported to APRA in some cases. For example, some funds that appointed 
trustees disclosed zero trustee cost in their financial reports. The management fee and 
performance fee are reported in various formats (as a percentage or fixed fee) in funds’ 
product disclosure statements and the calculation methods differ between funds. Furthermore, 
certain fees paid to related parties are not appropriately accounted for in the superannuation 
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funds industry (Liu & Arnold, 2010). A recent national review of the Australian 
superannuation system identifies disclosure as one of the key factors in ensuring 
superannuation funds operate effectively (Cooper, 2010). Of special interest is the quality of 
the disclosed information. For this paper, we measured the level of voluntary disclosure by 
funds using disclosure indices and conducted a cross-sectional analysis of what drives the 
level of disclosure for Australian industry and public sector superannuation funds. The 
findings suggest important implications for the choice of superannuation funds by employees, 
and the way forward in developing disclosure practices in the industry.  
We focus on fund-specific factors that drive voluntary disclosure and argue that the 
decision to disclose is based on a fund’s proprietary cost and governance arrangement. 
Agency problems and information asymmetry arise when the ownership of capital is 
separated from the control of decision-making (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980). This 
agency issue can be applied to equity and portfolio investments such as pension funds 
(superannuation funds, used interchangeably). Superannuation funds invest members’ capital 
into financial products such as managed fund products. The financial product managers then 
act on behalf of the members by choosing the appropriate investment strategies based on the 
latter’s mandates, while the capital that is invested remains the property of the members. This 
represents an analogous situation to an investment into an exchange-listed equity or fund 
where a fund manager invests the shareholders/stockholders’ funds on the latter’s behalf. 
With respect to disclosure, in both cases the investors or capital providers will evaluate and 
choose the funds based on information provided by the financial institution (fund managers 
or superannuation funds). “Agency and structural issues” are especially prominent in the 
Australian superannuation funds that are argued to deter market competition and the 
incentives for members to become effective monitors of their contributions (Cooper, 2010). A 
stringent regulatory environment promotes better disclosure practices, such as the case in the 
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banking sector (Munir et al., 2011). Given the vagueness of current regulatory requirements, 
disclosure of superannuation fund information relies on the fund insiders (i.e. trustees and 
managers, who are the information holders). For this project, we examined the information in 
superannuation funds’ annual reports, product disclosure statements, and websites to collect 
data for thirteen categories of information that are important in driving employees’ decisions 
in choosing a fund to which they would contribute. These categories were selected due to 
information availability, and were closely related to a fund’s agency issues, fees and 
performance, which were deemed as priorities for comparability between funds (Cooper, 
2010). We developed three disclosure indices that measured the disclosure of superannuation 
funds’ trustee boards, investment options and agents, and fee information, respectively. An 
Overall Disclosure Index, which consisted of the three indices, was calculated to assess the 
overall level of information disclosed to current members and potential new members, and 
compared to fund peers. 
Our results show that trustee board size has a positive but weak effect on overall 
voluntary disclosure, and particularly disclosing investment options and agents’ information. 
Board independence has a mixed effect on the various voluntary disclosure indices and the 
results are not significant. Disclosure costs measured by operating expenses influence all of 
the disclosure indices significantly and negatively except trustee board information. Fund 
type and size are not significant estimators of voluntary disclosure. We further conduct 
robustness checks using additional control variables, including whether a fund offers 
accumulation and public offer options, the number of trustee board committees and the 
percentage of pensioners in a fund. We find that the explanatory power of disclosure costs is 
robust in all indices, while the effect by board size varies. Our results are different to some of 
the past findings in the corporate governance and voluntary disclosure literature (Cheng & 
Courtenay, 2006; Sanchez et al., 2011), indicating that external factors such as institutional 
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environment and industry differences have an intimate interplay with internal factors on 
voluntary disclosure. 
In the next section, we develop the literature review and hypotheses. The third section 
discusses our research methodology and the study’s empirical results. The fourth section 
provides discussion of the findings, and the final section is our conclusion. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW & HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Voluntary disclosure can be driven by both internal (firm-specific) and external 
(institutional, regulatory and environmental) factors (Lopes & Rodrigues, 2007). In this 
paper, we focus on how internal factors drive voluntary disclosure in superannuation funds. 
Disclosure and the transparency of superannuation funds management are crucial for 
effective communication between trustees and their members. These elements have both 
informative and educational purposes, with trustees presenting key information and justifying 
financial decisions to members. As the laws for superannuation choice are enacted, 
superannuation funds have a moral obligation to disclose useful information to facilitate 
decision-making by current and potential members. By 2010, since the introduction of the 
2005 superannuation choice legislation, employees have had the choice of more than 196 
funds, each providing multiple investment options. In such an environment, one would expect 
that the contributing employees will opt for superannuation funds that generate the highest 
returns, charge the lowest fees, are sustainable with their operations, and disclose information 
to confirm all of the above; hence, superannuation funds should disclose this information to 
the public so they can make informed decisions. For example, the “MySuper” option is 
proposed to offer a default option that standardises a number of features including the 
transparency of information that will improve comparability between funds (Cooper, 2010). 
Currently, there are two key obstacles that affect how employees make the choice of their 
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superannuation funds. First, employees already in a fund may have to pay fees to switch to 
another provider. Second, a new employee is often encouraged to join a specific 
superannuation fund provider nominated by their employer, even though the employee is free 
to opt for another provider (Cooper, 2010). The Cooper Review (2010, p. 8) identifies that 
the “lack of information and transparency about fees and performance” combined with 
product complexity lead to the current weak competitive environment in the superannuation 
funds sector. In this market environment, we aim to explain what drives not-for-profit 
superannuation funds to disclose information to the market. We focus on examining 
superannuation funds’ annual reports, product disclosure, and official websites to gauge the 
current levels of, and reasons for, disclosure. We use corporate governance and voluntary 
disclosure literature to develop our theoretical framework. We argue that the decision to 
disclose is a function of proprietary costs and trustee governance arrangement.  
2.1 Proprietary Costs and Fund Type 
By disclosing information, funds face the risk of sharing private strategic information of 
which competitors may take advantage (Darrough & Stoughton, 1990). More specifically, 
disclosure could send signals indicating the value of, and developments within, a firm, 
product, or worker (Stiglitz, 1979). Verrecchia (1983) argues that disclosure costs (including 
dissemination and proprietary costs) are only incurred if a firm discloses information. On the 
other hand, Wagenhofer (1990) shows that the proprietary part of disclosure costs can be 
incurred even if a firm chooses not to disclose; this could result in a situation where a rival 
firm chooses to act upon nondisclosure signals to gain an advantage. Furthermore, Gigler 
(1994) argues that firms can create credibility for themselves, and influence the market and 
rivals’ perceptions, to the disclosers’ advantage by voluntarily disclosing high proprietary 
information if the information is not verifiable. When information is asymmetrical and 
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research is costly, information holders (insiders) will choose to exploit information 
distribution to fulfil their own objectives; this, in turn, will affect product types, prices, 
demand, and supply of information in the market (Stiglitz, 1979). Disclosure is especially 
important in markets filled with dispersed ownership structures, where the monitoring of 
agents (management) by board of directors on behalf of shareholders is essential in mitigating 
shirking behaviours (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The agency problem in superannuation 
funds is widely discussed in a number of past research papers (Drew & Standford, 2003; 
Coleman et al., 2006; Bateman & Thorp, 2007; Bryan et al., 2009b; Benson et al., 2011). In 
superannuation funds, there is a vast pool of capital providers who do not manage and 
monitor their interests directly; this mimics the dispersed ownership structures in the equity 
market. The board of trustees, who have a similar role as the board of directors, monitors the 
appointment and performance of asset consultants and fund managers who represent the 
management of the funds on behalf of the members. Management influences accounting 
information, information type, and disclosure frequency based on their self-interest and 
constraints, which include taxes, regulations, political costs, disclosure costs, and the party 
with whom they engage (Watts & Zimmerman, 1978; Leftwich et al., 1981).  
The superannuation funds industry is divided into five main types: retail, corporate, 
industry, public sector, and self-managed. Each type is distinctive in terms of its strategies 
and target members. This has strong implications for proprietary costs as they vary among 
funds and types of funds. While the operation of each fund gives rise to its fund-specific 
proprietary costs, funds of the same type may share some similarities in their kinds and levels 
of costs. For example, Liu & Arnold (2010) found that the number of conflicts of interest and 
the resultant fees arising from related party transactions were different between retail and not-
for-profit superannuation funds in Australia; thus, the level of proprietary costs associated 
with voluntary disclosure will differ between fund types. Due to the presence of distinctive 
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fund type-specific operational strategies and characteristics, funds of the same type may 
choose their level of voluntary disclosure collectively as this would reduce the proprietary 
costs between these funds. The costs for funds of the same type remain high compared to 
other types of funds as the latter will not gain any spill-over benefits from the former’s 
disclosure (Simpson, 2008). Wagenhofer (1990) and Gigler (1994) also argue that partial 
voluntary disclosure of specific proprietary information will be undertaken if firms can deter 
rival advances in the market and achieve their objectives ex ante. Industry superannuation 
funds’ advertising campaigns demonstrate this when they draw the public’s attention to the 
costs and expenses of their organisations compared with the other types of funds, without 
comparing other performance parameters. Therefore, the type of fund affects the level of 
voluntary disclosure, and the direction of this effect is based on the type of specificity (i.e. 
agency and structural issues, and selection and representation of trustees) that a fund type has. 
That is, the higher the level of specificity a fund has, the higher the level of voluntary 
disclosure, because disclosing such information will not benefit other fund types. 
Hypothesis 1: Voluntary disclosure differs according to fund type. 
2.2 Disclosure Costs and Valuation Benefits 
Voluntary disclosure incurs costs arising from information collection, administration, and 
dissemination, as well as proprietary costs (Simpson, 2008). The decision to disclose 
information to the market is based on the trade-off between disclosure costs and potential 
benefits derived (Simpson, 2008). We argue that the ultimate objective of a superannuation 
fund is to achieve long-term fund growth and sustainability; disclosure can potentially 
provide this benefit. Increasing fund size may potentially drive operating and investment 
costs down, which is an increased benefit for members. On the other hand, increased 
voluntary disclosure may drive operating costs up (due to the need to collect, administer and 
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disseminate information). Moreover, as discussed earlier, proprietary costs may potentially 
increase the costs associated with voluntary disclosure depending on the type of fund and 
information being disclosed. Information users who are not familiar with disclosure rules and 
regulations are less likely to take disclosed information on face value (Khumawala et al., 
2005). We do not expect the general public to be familiar with disclosure rules and 
regulations given that the current body of superannuation regulations and laws are complex 
and dissipated in various sources (Donald, 2011). Hence, members will scrutinise the 
information disclosed by funds when making their contribution decision. Funds would base 
their analysis of this trade-off between costs and benefits on past financial figures. High 
operating costs may influence a superannuation trustee to give priority to reducing costs 
through maintaining a low level of disclosure. On the other hand, if past performance shows a 
direct correlation between voluntary information disclosure and fund growth, funds may 
choose to increase their disclosure. 
Hypothesis 2: Disclosure costs are negatively related to voluntary disclosure. 
2.3 Fund Governance 
The Cooper Review stipulates that governance models should affect all facets of fund 
operations and performance (Cooper, 2010). International studies have focused on fund 
governance as a critical issue in the management and performance of pension funds (Myners, 
2000; Ambachtsheer et al., 2007; Stewart & Yermo, 2008; Clapman, 2007). Depending on 
the level of financial literacy, members rely on the trustees to decide on the investment 
options from which they could choose from (Gallery et al., 2011). Furthermore, 
superannuation trustees appoint asset consultants and fund managers to operate their funds, 
while some funds may run an in-house asset management team. Trustees outsourced 
substantial fund operations including key decision-making areas such as strategic asset 
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allocation and performance monitoring to consultants (Gupta et al., 2007; Sy et al., 2008). 
Specifically, trustees have the greatest input in selecting an administrator, asset consultant, 
setting objectives and risk tolerance, in this order of importance (Sy et al., 2008). Asset 
consultants and fund managers have their unique sets of private information that have a 
potential impact on fund returns (Drew & Standford, 2003). Trustees play the role of fee 
negotiators with asset consultants and fund managers; hence, fund governance models affect 
the level of fees and operating expenses passed on to members (Bryan et al., 2009a). This 
multi-layer agency relationship complicates the determination of the level of proprietary costs 
in the superannuation industry. The proprietary costs may be associated with the ultimate 
information holder (namely, the fund manager), then are passed down to the asset consultants 
and trustees. At each agency level, information may or may not be fully disseminated at the 
discretion of the communicator. In order to perform a thorough assessment of information 
asymmetry, quality, and integrity, members will need to infer details from the information 
disseminated through the communication chain. 
Fund governance measured in terms of the trustee board is an exogenous factor to fund 
disclosure, since trustees are currently paid a fixed fee that is not tied to funds’ performance; 
our data shows, in some cases, trustee directors perform their roles on a voluntary basis 
(unless their fees were not recorded under trustee fees or reported properly in the APRA’s 
financial data). We argue that the objectives of the trustees are to maximise the benefits to 
members and sustain fund growth and returns. It is the duty of trustees and directors to 
minimise the gap between the objectives of the superannuation funds and external agents 
with clear mandates and communication policies, effective monitoring, and reviews. 
Trustees, not management, are the main holders of information about the operations of 
superannuation funds. Hence, we focus on superannuation fund trustees as the information 
gatekeepers. 
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Board Size 
There is no study that empirically examines the characteristics of trustees on 
voluntary disclosure. In corporate governance, a larger board is related to better disclosure 
(measured in terms of earnings accuracy by analyst coverage) due to more consistent board 
operations and communication policies (Cheng, 2008; Byard et al., 2006). In another study, 
board size is found to have no association with voluntary disclosure (Cheng & Courtenay, 
2006), or the timeliness of earnings announcements (Bushman et al., 2004). Furthermore, 
Sanchez et al. (2011) argue that larger board size influences the effectiveness of control 
mechanisms and board monitoring efficiencies. Board size may be affected by fund size, 
growth rate, and merger activities. Nevertheless, we argue that, as a trustee board grows, 
there is an increased diversification of directors’ expertise, a reduction in monitoring and 
information costs, and an improved balance in the representation of members’ interests; all 
these lead to improved disclosure policies and practices, and better voluntary disclosure. 
Hypothesis 3: Board size is positively related to voluntary disclosure. 
Independent Trustees  
Board composition is linked to disclosure, and the presence of independent directors 
can elicit contradictory outcomes. Where studies find independent directors contribute 
positively to the level of voluntary disclosure (Babío Arcay & Muiño Vázquez, 2005; Cheng 
& Courtenay, 2006), another argues these directors are negatively related to disclosure due to 
the substitution effect between the two (Eng & Mak, 2003). In addition, the degree of 
information asymmetry between outside directors and firm insiders (such as the CEO), 
affects how the former could contribute to firm value; the high cost of information would 
reduce the value of outside directors to a firm (Duchin et al., 2010; Sanchez et al., 2011).  
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The SIS Act 1994 stipulates that the employer- and employee-nominated trustees must 
be equally represented in a fund; independent nomination can then be decided by the trustee 
board. We argue that better board independence can lead to a greater level of voluntary 
disclosure in superannuation funds. Independent trustees have better professional governance 
knowledge that can contribute to better disclosure and communication policies and practices. 
In addition, being an outsider, independent directors frequently collect and request 
information to perform their roles, this internalises information costs on behalf of fund 
members.  
Hypothesis 4: Board independence is positively related to voluntary disclosure. 
The following section discusses our methodology and the results from testing our 
hypotheses. 
3. METHODOLOGY & RESULTS 
We focus on trustee governance of the industry superannuation funds (industry 
superfunds) and public sector funds, both of which are currently under-researched. The 
industry and public sector funds’ combined value of assets under management is the second 
largest, following the retail superannuation fund segment in the Australian superannuation 
industry. By 2010, these two categories of fund managed almost half of the assets under 
management in the sector1 with assets of AUD$96.6 billion and AUD$218.9 billion, 
respectively (compared with AUD$47.5 and AUD$330.4 billion for the corporate and retail 
sector funds) (APRA, 2011).  
Table 1: Funds Sample Construction 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
All APRA-regulated Industry and public sector superannuation funds 
Industry 75 77 71 69 65 63 60 
Public Sector 23 23 22 20 20 19 20 
                                                            
1 Excluding self-managed funds, pooled superannuation trusts and public sector superannuation schemes. 
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Funds excluded from the sample (non-surviving funds or information not disclosed2) 
Industry 13 12 6 4 0 2 1 
Public Sector 8 8 7 5 5 5 6 
Final sample  
Industry 62 65 65 65 65 61 59 
Public Sector 15 15 15 15 15 14 14 
Total number of funds in the final sample 77 80 80 80 80 75 73 
The superannuation fund sample is initially drawn from official data provided by 
APRA, the government institution supervising superannuation funds. We started with a list of 
all APRA-regulated industry and public sector superannuation funds with more than four 
members. This sample excluded pooled superannuation, as well as exempted public sector 
superannuation schemes. The sample is further reduced as we excluded funds with non-
disclosed financial information or non-surviving funds with fewer than three years of data. 
Based on our initial sample, we sought additional information using various sources. These 
included annual reports and press releases, which are considered important sources of 
information for firms (Gul & Leung, 2009). When selecting and reviewing superannuation 
structure and performance, members and potential members rely on the product disclosure 
statement (PDS), annual reports, and official websites for information and comparisons 
across different funds. We used these sources as the main disclosure channels for funds to 
communicate with members and the market. In addition, corporations disclose information on 
the internet to reach a wider coverage of stakeholders and provide them with a timely and  
broad scope of information (Sanchez et al., 2011).  In order to examine the current trustee 
governance structures, we collected information on trustee board size and independence. We 
also collected information about CEO-Chairman duality and dropped this variable given that 
this practice is not present in our sample. The information on superannuation funds 
governance is greatly limited and past years’ records are usually not maintained on websites. 
Therefore, we collected the governance variables for the financial year 2009. Our sample 
                                                            
2 To protect the privacy of members, APRA did not disclose information on all the funds recorded. 
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suffers survival bias because past records of trustee information, annual reports and PDSs are 
not maintained for public access by the funds or regulators. Information about trustees and 
board composition are fairly stable over a long period of time of at least 5 years (Gupta et al., 
2007; Sy et al., 2008). We obtained industry and public sector superannuation funds financial 
data from APRA for the period 2004-2010. From this dataset, we extracted annual data on 
fund types, operating expenses and fund characteristics. 
Table 2: Definitions of variables. 
Variable Definitions 
Board size (bsize) The total number of trustees per fund. 
Independence (pindpt) The percentage of independent directors per fund. 
type Fund type, where 1 = industry fund, 0 = public fund. 
Logopexp09 Natural log of fund’s operating expenses (normalized by fund size) for 
the year 2009. 
Members09 Natural log of fund’s number of membership for the year 2009. 
Size09 Natural log of fund size (end-of-year net assets) for the year 2009. 
Board Disclosure Index 
(BDI) 
The sum of the following, where the highest score is 4 points: 
1 = trustee information is disclosed; 0 otherwise. 
1 = trustee committee information is disclosed; 0 otherwise. 
1 = directors’ names are disclosed; 0 otherwise. 
1 = nominator information is disclosed; 0 otherwise. 
Investment Disclosure Index 
(IDI) 
The sum of the following, where the highest score is 4 points: 
1 = fund manager information is disclosed; 0 otherwise. 
1 = asset consultant information is disclosed; 0 otherwise. 
1 = investment allocation information are disclosed; 0 otherwise. 
1 = investment option information is disclosed; 0 otherwise. 
Fee Disclosure Index (FDI) The sum of the following, where the highest score is 5 points: 
1 = administrative cost information is disclosed; 0 otherwise. 
1 = investment management fee information is disclosed; 0 otherwise. 
1 = performance fee information are disclosed; 0 otherwise. 
1 = withdrawal fee information is disclosed; 0 otherwise. 
1 = investment switching fee information is disclosed; 0 otherwise. 
Overall Disclosure Index 
(ODI) 
The sum of BDI, IDI AND FDI: 
ODI = BDI + IDI + FDI  
Where the highest score is 13 points
Table 2 summarises the variables and their definitions as used in this paper. Board 
size (bsize) measures the total number of trustees per fund. Board independence (pindpt) is 
measured by the percentage of independent trustees per fund. Fund type (type) is a dummy 
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variable to indicate whether a fund is an industry fund (value = 1) or a public sector fund 
(value = 0). Operating expenses, measured as the average operating expenses weighted by 
fund size (total asset value) per member, is a proxy for disclosure costs given the limitation of 
financial information reported by the superannuation funds and regulators. We correct for 
abnormal distribution in operating expenses, fund membership and size by applying natural 
log to the data.  
We follow Sanchez et al. (2011) and develop four unweighted disclosure indices using 
binary variables to measure the level of voluntary disclosure of various types of information. 
First, the Board Disclosure Index (BDI) measures the level each fund discloses about its trust 
and trustee identity, trustee committee structure, and trustee nomination. A point is allocated 
to each category of information with the highest score being 4 points and the lowest 0 for this 
index. The second index is the Investment Disclosure Index (IDI), which measures whether a 
fund discloses information about the identity of its fund managers and asset consultant, its 
investment allocation and investment options. A point is allocated if information is found; 4 
points being the highest and 0 meaning no disclosure at all. The third index is the Fee 
Disclosure Index (FDI) that measures the level of fund disclosure associated with information 
of administrative cost, investment management fee, performance fee, withdrawal fee, and 
investment switching fee. There are five categories of information for this index where full 
disclosure  is 5 points and no disclosure is 0. The last index, the Overall Disclosure Index 
(ODI) consolidates the previous three indices to give an overall disclosure measure of each 
fund. The maximum 13 points indicates full disclosure and 0 indicates no information is 
disclosed. The information for the disclosure indices is also collected from PDS, annual 
reports and websites for 2009. 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of variables. 
   Mean  Minimum  Maximum  Std. Dev.  Observations
bsize 8.0000 4 17 2.7548 74 
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pindpt 0.0951 0 1 0.1730 70 
fundtype 0.8148 0 1 0.3909 81
ODI 10.1852 0 13 3.5147 81 
BDI 3.3210 0 4 1.0820 81 
IDI 3.2469 0 4 1.2897 81 
FDI 3.6173 0 5 1.5777 81 
logopexp09 -8.8899 -12.7169 -3.4402 1.9633 75 
members09 10.66 6.51 14.49 1.76 75 
size09 13.82 9.03 17.13 1.60 75 
bsize represents board size. pindpt represents the ratio of the number of independent directors to the total number 
of directors on a trustee board. fundtype represents fund type. ODI represents Overall Disclosure Index. BDI 
represents Board Disclosure Index. IDI represents Investment Disclosure Index. FDI represents Fee Disclosure 
Index. Logopexp09 represents natural log of operating expenses (normalised by fund size) for the year 2009. 
members09 represents the natural log of fund membership in 2009. size09 represents the natural log of fund size 
(end-of-year net assets value) in 2009. For the detail definitions of variables, refer to Table 1. 
Table 3 describes our dataset. An average trustee board consists of eight trustees with the 
maximum size being seventeen seats, similar to past studies (Gupta et al., 2007; Sy et al., 
2008). The overall level of board independence is low in the industry and public sector 
superannuation funds. Some trustee boards do not have independent trustees; on average, 
there is 9.5% board independence, with a small standard deviation of 0.1730. An average 
fund incurred $0.0010 operating expense per dollar of the fund’s total assets per member in 
2009, and little change is observed over time: an average of $0.0012 between the period 2005 
and 2009. On the other hand, fund membership in the industry and public sector 
superannuation funds has enjoyed an average growth of 11.54% between 2005 and 2009, 
with 0.03% growth recorded for the year 2009. This is not to say that every fund has grown 
over time, which is indicated by a large standard deviation of 97.61; some funds have seen 
their membership shrink. The industry and public sector superannuation funds have 
performed well on average across all disclosure indices, with an average of: 3.3/4.0 in board 
disclosure (BDI), 3.2/4.0 in investment disclosure (IDI), 3.6/5.0 in fee disclosure (FDI) and 
10.2/13.0 in overall disclosure (ODI). 
Table 4 shows the correlations between variables. There is evidence to support the 
argument that internal governance mechanisms (such as the trustee board) have a relationship 
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with disclosure practices. First, board size (bsize) has a significant and positive correlation 
with all disclosure indices; 0.3350 (ρ < 5%) with ODI, 0.3704 (ρ < 5%) with BDI, 0.2258 (ρ 
< 10%) with IDI and 0.2051 (ρ < 10%) with FDI. Second, board independence (pindpt) is 
negatively correlated with ODI (-0.2143, ρ < 10%), IDI (-0.2332, ρ < 10%) and FDI (-
0.2446, ρ < 5%). This is inconsistent with the findings of Arcay and Vázquez (2005) and Gul 
and Leung (2009), but supports the argument of a substitution effect between independent 
directors and disclosure by Eng and Mak (2003). Fund operating expenses (logopex09) have 
significant and negative correlations with disclosure indices, except in the disclosure of 
trustee board information (BDI). This may be due to the equal representation rule that 
governs trustee board formation and the selection of trustees. In the industry and public sector 
superannuation funds with a paternalistic characteristic (Donald, 2011), where directors are 
often selected from the pool of members or nominated by employers and industry association, 
there may be existing trust in the trustee directorship by fund members; hence, no need arises 
to increase the transparency of the trustee structure and directors’ profiles. Nevertheless, 
disclosure costs are a serious consideration when it comes to decisions about transparency. 
Fund type has no correlation with voluntary disclosure. The correlations between fund size 
measured in terms of total asset value and the number of members have mixed results with 
the various disclosure indices. Board size is correlated with fund size at the 1% significance 
level, while board independence has no correlation with any fund characteristic variables. 
This is an indication, perhaps, of a lack of role and contribution by independent trustees on 
the oversight of superannuation funds in the current structure. 
Table 4: Correlations Table 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 -          
2 -0.1189 -         
3 -0.1389  0.2832† -        
4  0.3350^ -0.2143* -0.1613 -       
5  0.3704^  0.1171 -0.0528  0.8125^ -      
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6  0.2258* -0.2332* -0.1370  0.9191^  0.6502^ -     
7  0.2051* -0.2446† -0.1736  0.9194^  0.5928^  0.7842^ -    
8 -0.1714  0.4984^  0.4894^ -0.3161^  0.0149 -0.3814^ -0.3751^ -   
9  0.4408^ -0.0234 -0.2766†  0.3272^  0.2507†  0.2325^  0.3395^ -0.4561^ -  
10  0.5464^ -0.1690 -0.3197^  0.2338†  0.1602  0.1630  0.2578† -0.5144^ 0.8034^ - 
*10%, †5%, ^1% significance level. 1=bsize, 2=pindpt, 3=type, 4=ODI, 5=BDI, 6=IDI, 7=FDI, 
8=logopex09, 9=members09, 10=size09 
 
3.1 Regression Analysis   
Our research questions focus on voluntary disclosure in four categories of fund 
information in the Australian industry and public sector superannuation funds. We aim to 
explain what drives funds to disclose information about their trustee structure and 
composition, investment team and strategies, and fee structure. 
To test our research question on voluntary disclosure of fund information, we 
developed four indices, namely ODI, BDI, IDI and FDI. Please see Table 2 for a detailed 
description of each index. Based on our literature review, we developed the following 
ordinary least square regression (OLS) model: 
iiiiiiii sizepindptbsizeopextypeDisclosure   54321                 (1)  
where Disclosure is measured by ODI, BDI, IDI and FDI; type = fund type; opex = operating 
expenses, bsize = trustee board size, pindpt = the percentage of independent trustee per fund. 
We use two proxies for fund size (size): (1) end-of-year total asset value per fund; (2) end-of-
year total number of members per fund. We found the results between the two proxies are 
robust, hence we will only report the first proxy in our following result tables. 
 
Table 5: This table shows the OLS results for Overall Disclosure Index (ODI), Board Disclosure 
Index (BDI), Investment Disclosure Index (IDI) and Fee Disclosure Index (FDI). The estimators in 
the models include trustee type (type), normalised operating expenses (opex09), board size (bsize) and 
board independence percentage (pindpt). Fund size (logsize09) is a control variable. The standard 
errors reported in this table are white heteroskedasticity-consistent. 
Models ODI BDI IDI FDI 
Variables coef. t-stat coef. t-stat coef. t-stat coef. t-stat 
Constant   9.6937  4.3555 2.3077  3.1964  4.6067  4.5909  2.7793  1.9929 
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(2.2256^) (0.7220^) (1.0034^) (1.3946†) 
type -0.2454 -0.2207 
(1.1121) 
0.0385  0.1067 
(0.3607) 
-0.0378 -0.0754 
(0.5014) 
-0.2461 -0.3532 
(0.6968) 
opex09 -2.4601 -3.0978 
(0.7941^) 
0.1173  0.4553 
(0.2576) 
-1.4048  3.9235 
(0.3580^) 
-1.1726 -2.3564 
(0.4976†) 
bsize   0.1686  1.7801 
(0.0947*) 
0.0441  1.4364 
(0.0307) 
 0.0900  2.1087 
(0.0427†) 
 0.0344  0.5800 
(0.0593) 
pindpt   0.5780  0.4067 
(1.4211) 
0.3332  0.7228 
(0.4610) 
 0.3120  0.4870 
(0.6407) 
-0.0673 -0.0755 
(0.8905) 
logsize09  0.0264  0.1463 
(0.1802) 
0.0674  1.1521 
(0.0585) 
-0.1183 -1.4554 
(0.0813) 
 0.0773  0.6842 
(0.1129) 
         
F-value 5.9488  1.5517  6.0381  4.2694  
Adj R-
squared 0.2757 
 0.0407 0.2793  0.2010  
Ρ 0.0002  0.1876 0.0001  0.0022  
N 66  66  66  66  
*10%, †5%, ^1% significance level. Heteroskadasticity-robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
 
Table 5 shows the OLS results for the four indices based on equation 1. We report the 
heteroskadasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. The results show that the short-term 
negative effect (coef.=-2.4601) on overall disclosure (ODI) is significant at the 1% level for 
operating expenses. The result is consistent for IDI (coef.= -1.4048, p < 1%; not significant in 
the model using fund membership as a fund size’s proxy) and FDI (coef. = -1.1726, p < 5%). 
Overall, we found that disclosure costs are the primary factor influencing funds’ disclosure 
practices, with a negative relationship between disclosure costs and transparency, supporting 
H2. This also supports Simpson’s (2008) notion of a trade-off between disclosure costs and 
the potential benefits derived. Board size has a positive effect on ODI (coef. = 0.1686, p < 
10%) and IDI (coef. = 0.0900, p < 5%). This supports H3. The combination of expertise and 
knowledge, and the dynamics of the working relationships and objectives of individuals may 
be different between an equal-presentation selection model and a merit-based selection model 
(as seen in the corporate sector); hence, our results diverge from the corporate governance 
literature. We do not find that fund type, board independence or fund size influence 
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disclosure practices. Therefore, H1 and H4 are rejected. Our Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
scores for the estimators are below the threshold of 10; hence, no significant multicollinearity 
is present in our models. 
3.2 Robustness Tests 
We use four additional control variables in our robustness tests. Firstly, accumulation 
(accum) is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if a fund offers the accumulation option; 
otherwise, it is 0. An accumulation option differs from the defined benefit structure in which 
fund members can select and change their investment strategy (i.e. conservative, balanced or 
aggressive strategy) that they desire at any point in time. The offering of the accumulation 
option requires that funds disclose more relevant information to their members to assist the 
latter with their decision-making. The number of committees (ncomm) measures the number 
of committees that a fund trustee board has. Board committees assist trustees by providing 
them with specific areas of expertise and knowledge, thereby enhancing information 
collection and sharing in a fund’s governance structure. The percentage of members who are 
pensioners (pension09) in a fund affects the investment options and products and operational 
costs, resulting in different communication strategies, information types, and collection and 
dissemination processes. Lastly, public offer (po) is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 
if a fund opens its membership to the public (public offer fund); otherwise, it is 0. Under the 
SIS Act 1994, a public offer fund has to meet more stringent requirements in terms of the 
establishment of their trustee board, information disclosure to members and prospective 
members, and the level of member contribution. Hence, public offers may affect the 
voluntary disclosure practices of superannuation funds. 
Table 6 shows the results of the robustness tests. We exclude the results for BDI 
because none of the models are significant. We found that disclosure costs (operating 
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expenses) is a reliable and significant factor in explaining voluntary disclosure using ODI, 
IDI and FDI. In 10 out of 12 models, it has a negative effect at the 1% significance level on 
voluntary disclosure; one model shows a negative effect at the 5% significance level, while 
the other shows the same effect, but not significantly. Board size shows a consistently 
positive effect on voluntary disclosure in all three indices; however, the significance varies 
between 5%, 10%, and not significant at all. Fund type and board independence are both 
unreliable and not significant estimators of voluntary disclosure. The signs of their effects 
change in different models, yielding inconclusive results. The number of committees displays 
reliable positive effect on ODI, IDI and FDI; their significance level varies between 5% and 
10% levels. This indicates that the trustee composition that gives rise to a collection of 
expertise and knowledge plays an important role in voluntary disclosure. Pension09 has a 
negative and significant effect on ODI, IDI and FDI, with levels of between 1% and 5%.  
This indicates that a higher proportion of pensioners in a fund leads to lower voluntary 
disclosure. Public offer are significant at 1% with a positive effect on FDI, supporting the 
notion that by opening to public membership, funds are more proactive in disclosing 
information - in this case, about fees - to members and prospective members. Other control 
variables are found to have no significant effect on voluntary disclosure and their signs of 
effect are arbitrary. 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: This table shows the robustness test results using OLS for Overall Disclosure Index (ODI), 
Investment Disclosure Index (IDI) and Fee Disclosure Index (FDI). The results for Board Disclosure 
Index (BDI) are not reported due to the insignificance of all of the estimation models. The estimators 
in the models include trustee type (type), normalised operating expenses (opex09), board size (bsize) 
and board independence percentage (pindpt). Fund size (logsize09) is a control variable. Additional 
control variables are introduced separately in four models (1-4) to test the robustness of the 
estimators. The additional control variables include accum (dummy variable with 1 indicates that a 
fund has accumulation product; 0 otherwise); ncomm (the number of committees that a trustee board 
has); pension09 (the percentage of pension fund members in a fund); and po (dummy variable with 1 
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indicates that a fund has public offer; 0 otherwise). Only significant control variables are reported in 
the table. The standard errors reported in this table are white heteroskedasticity-consistent. 
  (1) accum (2) ncomm (3) pension09 (4) po 
ODI     
type (+), not significant (+), not significant (+), not significant (+), not significant 
opex09 (-), p < 1% (-), p < 1% (-), p < 1% (-), p < 1% 
bsize (+), p < 10% (+), not significant (+), not significant (+), p < 10% 
pindpt (+), not significant (-), not significant (-), not significant (+), not significant
logsize09 (-), not significant (-), not significant (+), not significant (-), not significant 
ncomm - (+), p < 10% - - 
pension09 - - (-), p < 1% - 
Adj. R-sq. 0.2650 0.5257 0.3241 0.2764 
Model p-value 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 
N 66 46 62 66 
IDI     
type (-), not significant (-), not significant (+), not significant (-), not significant 
opex09 (-), p < 1% (-), p < 1% (-), p < 1% (-), p < 1% 
bsize (+), p < 10% (+), p < 10% (+), p < 10% (+), p < 5% 
pindpt (+), not significant (+), not significant (+), not significant (+), not significant 
logsize09 (-), not significant (-), p < 10% (-), not significant (-), not significant 
ncomm -  (+), p < 10% - - 
pension09 - - (-), p < 1% - 
Adj. R-sq. 0.2682 0.5505 0.2831 0.2738 
Model p-value 0.0004 0.0000 0.0003 0.0003 
N 66 46 62 66 
FDI     
type (-), not significant (-), not significant (+), not significant (-), not significant 
opex09 (-), p < 5% (-), not significant (-), p < 1% (-), p < 1% 
bsize (+), not significant (+), not significant (+), not significant (+), not significant 
pindpt (-), not significant (-), p < 5% (-), not significant (-), not significant 
logsize09 (+), not significant (+), p < 5% (+), not significant (-), not significant 
ncomm - (+), p < 5% - - 
pension09 - - (-), p < 5% - 
po -  - - (+), p < 1% 
Adj. R-sq. 0.1916 0.4036 0.3776 0.2515 
Model p-value 0.0044 0.0001 0.0000 0.0006 
N 66 46 62 66 
     
4. DISCUSSION 
Many past disclosure studies focus on the level of disclosure and how it affects firm 
value and investor behaviours. Derived from both Accounting and Finance literature, we 
explain what drives disclosure practices. We find voluntary disclosure of fund product 
information is affected by disclosure costs and, to a lesser extent, fund governance. 
Disclosure costs measured in terms of operating expenses has a significant and reliable 
23 
 
influence over voluntary disclosure. Specifically, higher disclosure costs lead to a lower level 
of disclosure. Given that there is an increasing number of fund mergers over time in the 
Australian superannuation industry, funds are developing economies of scale in terms of 
membership and operating costs. Therefore, funds consider the trade-off between potential 
benefits and disclosure costs seriously and are able to manage the balance more effectively. 
Trustee board structure has less influence than trustee board composition in determining the 
level of voluntary disclosure. Trustee board structure measured by board size is to a large 
extent determined by fund size and the equal-representation rule in the nomination of 
trustees. This may deteriorate the natural effect of trustee board structure on voluntary 
disclosure as those seen in the corporate sector. Although we did not measure the profile and 
background of individual trustee, the number of board committees serves as a close proxy of 
trustee board composition and show significant positive effect on voluntary disclosure. This 
implies that the dynamics and interplay of expertise and knowledge among trustees in 
influencing decision-making are as important as in a corporate board of directors. More 
thorough research is required in this area.  
We also demonstrate that different factors drive specific types of information. This 
supports the disclosure and information efficiency literature, which argues that the sharing of 
information is driven by the private objectives, abilities and constraints of the information 
holder (Verrecchia, 1983; Stiglitz, 1979; Darrough & Stoughton, 1990; Gigler, 1994). We 
also show that the recipient of information may have a role in influencing the level and type 
of information that is disclosed. Our results show that the disclosure of fees is influenced by 
whether a fund is open to public membership. The disclosure of fees could be viewed by fund 
members to assess how efficiently a fund is being run. In not-for-profit entities, it is found 
that fund sponsors are mostly trusting about reported costs, especially in not scrutinising 
various classifications of ‘joint-costs’, such as those involved with fundraising, educational 
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materials, and other operating expenses (Khumawala et al., 2005). Members in Australian 
superannuation funds may trust their trustees to act in their best interests under the 
paternalistic governance arrangement through the equal representation rule of trustee 
nomination. This, in turn, influences the type and quality of information being shared by the 
funds. 
The multi-layer agency relationship in the superannuation funds industry may have a 
significant impact on the level and quality of information being disclosed. Our results show 
that the explanatory power of board size on voluntary disclosure may be restricted by the 
equal-representation nomination rule. Therefore, disclosure is also driven by the institutional 
environment in which an entity is operating. In addition, the equal representation of 
employer- and employee-nominated directors undermines the role of independent trustees in 
the Australian superannuation funds. Trustees in public sector and larger funds tend to be 
more conformed in their beliefs and resistant to radical change (Gupta et al., 2007). Our 
evidence demonstrates that board independence has no influence on disclosure practices. 
Although some may argue that improving disclosure may not mitigate agency conflicts in the 
superannuation funds industry (Stewart & Yermo, 2008), it is indisputable that disclosure 
practices are important ways for funds to communicate with members and the market, and an 
important source of information for product comparison and performance assessment. Via 
disclosure, market experts can also assess the credibility of the information providers and 
their associated agents (Gigler, 1994). 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
Our paper focuses on explaining what drives the disclosure of different types of product 
information in Australian industry and public sector superannuation funds. Our findings 
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about the factors influencing voluntary disclosure of superannuation funds’ product 
information shed light on the presence of agency conflicts and the future development of 
transparency in the industry. We draw on Accounting and Finance literature by combining 
the issues of proprietary information, disclosure costs and fund governance to develop our 
research model. Four disclosure indices examining the information disclosure of fund 
governance, investment, fees, and overall practices are developed and used in our regression 
models. We found evidence to support the hypotheses that disclosure costs and fund 
governance affect voluntary disclosure based on the type of disclosed information. 
The Australian superannuation funds industry is segregated by fund type (that is, industry, 
public sector, corporate, retail, and self-managed funds). Hence, this results in inter-type and 
intra-type competition among the funds. This gives rise to a complex combination of 
proprietary costs for disclosure. Disclosure costs in terms of operating expenses have a 
significant and negative effect on disclosure practices. The size of the trustee board has a 
significant positive but weak impact on disclosure, while board independence, which is 
restricted by current institutional factors, has mixed results on voluntary disclosure. 
Our study faced limitations in the availability of information about the Australian 
superfunds industry, and this had implications for the research methodologies we could 
employ to derive in-depth analyses. Nevertheless, we have provided a unique view of the 
superannuation industry and their levels of disclosure. We support the Cooper Review’s 
(2010) view that governance is crucial in the operation of superannuation funds, including 
their disclosure practices. We highlight that trustee board composition, which affects the 
dynamic play between individual trustee’s expertise and experience, plays a more significant 
role in voluntary disclosure than the trustee board structure. In addition, disclosure is driven 
by the institutional environment, the selection process of trustees and structure of funds (such 
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as whether a fund is open to the public). In their effort to promote market competition and 
improve fund comparability, policy-makers must take into consideration the endogenous and 
exogenous factors that affect funds’ disclosure practices. A standardised disclosure 
framework may improve comparability between funds, but this should not lead to a 
prescriptive governance framework across all funds as each fund possesses unique 
characteristics and structures. Therefore, funds should be allowed some flexibility to 
implement governance practices that are relevant to them, but be required to disclose 
information in a systematic format to enhance information symmetry in the industry. Further 
directions for research in this area could address understandings of trustee governance and 
their impact on fund returns and risk management. 
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